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Total war is not always associated with power seizure 
using physical means, however, the real meaning is how a 
country could implement the whole of resources to fight 
for their national interest. This study is aimed to provide 
an understanding that total war could be implemented in 
all areas of activities. The study is conducted with a 
qualitative descriptive method through a case study 
approach, library study, interview, and observation in the 
field. It has been implemented in defense diplomacy 
accordingly without our awareness. For instance, in the 
case of the delay in the Indonesia-Singapore Defence 
Cooperation Agreement (DCA) renegotiation which 
unites all personnel from different agencies and 
institutions, as well as all professional fields to come up 
with the same directions for Indonesia national interest. 
This study concludes that a total war strategy could be 
implemented in defense diplomacy to get a maximum 
result to fight for Indonesia’s national interest. 
 
© 2021 Published by Indonesia Defense University   
 





When we hear the word war, then what 
comes to our mind for the first time is that 
there is hostility between two countries 
which carry out a major armed battle 
between their armies resulting in a fairly 
intense gunfight that resulted in bloodshed 
between the warring parties. War is a 
continuation of the political conflict using 
another way (Clausewitz, 2007). However, 
this does not always have to happen, 
especially with the development of the 
generation of warfare which has entered the 
fifth period, where war is no longer 
conventionally interpreted as the use of 
force is carried out in disguise so that the 
target party does not realize that it has been 
involved in the war and loses (Qureshi, 
2019). Nonetheless, the essence of war 
itself has not changed, namely as an effort 
to achieve the national interest of a country 
by involving all the power it has and is not 
limited to military power only 
(Morgenthau, 1948).  So that every country 
is required to strategize in achieving 
national goals, in addition to defending the 
country's existence from attacks by other 
countries (Kemhan RI, 2014).  
For Indonesia, total war has been chosen 
as a strategy to be used to maintain the 
nation's sovereignty, maintain territorial 
integrity and save the entire Indonesian 
nation from attacks by other countries, 
carried out by all Indonesian people by 
mobilizing all their strength and national 
resources (Kemhan, 2015). For the 
Indonesian nation, the total war strategy is 
not only be used in a war that uses 
militaristic power and methods (hard 
power) but can also be applied in various 
forms of non-militaristic activities (soft 
power), in all kinds of places, with the 
involvement of the people, it does not have 
to be a combatant so that it can be 
implemented to face the era of the 21st 
century war generation (Prabowo, 2009). 
One of the soft power forms that can be 
used is conducting Defence Diplomacy 
activities, which are used as an important 
tool for implementing state policies in the 
field of national security and foreign policy 
during peacetime to fight for its national 
interests (Anwar, 2018).  
One of the objectives of Defense 
Diplomacy is to build mutual trust between 
countries to prevent war, which can be done 
in conducting cooperation agreements in 
the field of defense between countries 
(Cottey & Forster, 2013). One of the 
implementations of Defence Diplomacy 
activities is the existence of a cooperation 
agreement in the defense sector between 
Indonesia and Singapore, which, although it 
has been agreed upon, is still constrained 
from being fully implemented and is being 
renegotiated. Constraints that occur are due 
to a conflict of interest, including the 
potential threat to Indonesia's sovereignty 
over part of its jurisdiction (Hamdan, 2008). 
Efforts to renegotiate cannot run smoothly, 
this is because both parties carry their 
respective national interests so that the 
situation that occurs is like the situation on 
a battlefield, filled with the smell of battle 
and bloodshed in different forms, situations 
of uncertainty, trickery, and attacking each 
other by exploiting the weakness of the 
other, as Sun Tzu had said 2,500 years ago 
(Agopian, 1992). 
In a war situation at the negotiating table 
as described, to obtain optimal results in 
achieving national interests, an appropriate 
strategy is needed. The Indonesian Total 
war strategy is certainly expected to be used 
in the Defence Cooperation Agreement 
(DCA) negotiation process. How can this be 
implemented? In contrast to previous 
research related to DCA Indonesia-
Singapore, this research intends to analyze 
how the Total war strategy can be 
implemented in Defence Diplomacy 
activities, particularly in the DCA 
Indonesia-Singapore renegotiation process.  
 
METHODS 
The method used in this study is a 
phenomenological qualitative descriptive 
method, where the researcher will apply his 
subjectivity and interpersonal abilities in 
the exploratory research process 
 




(Helaluddin, 2018).  A qualitative approach 
with a phenomenological approach is a 
more relevant approach, with the research 
being conducted that seeks to understand 
the meaning of events and their 
relationships to certain parties in certain 
situations, to explain the phenomena that 
occur to implement the total war strategy in 
defence diplomacy activities, especially 
when doing the DCA renegotiation between 
Indonesia and Singapore. 
Sources of data used in this study are 
primary data sources obtained through 
interviews, empirical, and observation. 
Research is also carried out on secondary 
data sources obtained through 
documentation and literature. Data analysis 
techniques are carried out by using 
analytical coding techniques by processing 
and preparing data for analysis, reading the 
entire data, starting coding or data 
classification, participants, categories and 
themes to be analyzed, and interpretations 
of the available data (Creswell, 2013). 
The research begins with a more in-
depth analysis of the DCA Indonesia-
Singapore negotiation process, as well as 
the Flight Identification Region (FIR) 
realignment activities over the Riau Islands 
Provinces of Indonesia. The research 
continues with the discussion of the 
relationship between the total war strategy 
and defense diplomacy, so the strategy 
could be implemented in the ongoing 
renegotiation process of the Indonesia-
Singapore DCA. 
 
RESULT AND DISCUSSION 
The Long Journey of DCA Indonesia-
Singapore 
Defense cooperation between Indonesia-
Singapore has been going on since 1973 
when the two countries agreed to define 
maritime boundaries in the Singapore 
Strait. This collaboration continues and 
develops, which was marked starting in 
1980 when joint exercises of the three 
Forces were carried out with the initial 
SAFKAR/Sea Eagle/Elang Indopura. The 
two countries have realized the strategic 
importance of helping each other in the area 
of defense, including by building 
partnerships in various other defense fields, 
such as increasing the capacity of 
personnel, the Defence Industry, sharing 
information, and others (Kafrawy, 2014). 
Defence cooperation between the two 
countries has continued to increase, with 
one of them being agreed in 1995 to grant 
Singapore access to two Military Training 
Areas (MTA), which was followed by the 
construction of several Military training 
facilities which were funded by Singapore 
and which could then be used two 
countries’ Armed Forces. This agreement 
ended in 2003 and not extended, so the 
Singapore Armed Forces no longer had 
access to the MTA, including in Baturaja 
and Ara Island, with the reasons that the 
MTA (1) was used as a training ground for 
the Indonesian Armed Forces, (2) there are 
provisions for obtaining permission from 
the Singaporean party for the use of the 
MTA, and (3) there was a violation by the 
Singaporean party inviting a third party, in 
this case, is another country, to train 
together at the MTA without having a 
clearance from Indonesia. Access to the use 
of MTA is very beneficial for Singapore, 
which due to the limited area of its country 
makes it impossible to carry out military 
exercises with live munitions for its armed 
forces. So they continue to strive to be able 
to continue this defense cooperation. 
Singapore also takes advantage of 
several articles in UNCLOS, namely article 
51 (1) 1982 UNCLOS, in demanding 
Indonesia provide access to its country to 
carry out other legitimate activities which 
existed before the recognition of the 
Archipelago State, including for the 
implementation of its Armed Forces 
training. The details of article 51 (1) 1982 
UNCLOS reads as follow:  
Without prejudice to article 49, an 
archipelagic State shall respect existing 
agreements with other States and shall 
recognize traditional fishing rights and other 
legitimate activities of the immediately 
adjacent neighboring States in certain areas 
falling within archipelagic waters. The terms 
 




and conditions for the exercise of such rights 
and activities, including nature, the extent, 
and the areas to which they apply, shall, at 
the request of any of the States concerned, 
be regulated by bilateral agreements 
between them. Such rights shall not be 
transferred to or shared with third States or 
their nationals (UNCLOS, 1982). 
 
Singapore's efforts to gain access to the 
use of parts of Indonesia as a training 
ground for its Armed Forces finally brought 
results when in 2005 the Indonesia-
Singapore Defence Cooperation Agreement 
negotiations were restarted, which went 
through a series of tough negotiations in 
2007 signed by the Ministers of Defence of 
both countries and witnessed by the 
national leaders. However, then this DCA 
did not go as expected when the Indonesian 
Parliament did not agree to ratify the 
agreement (Sari, Permatasari, & Syawf, 
2013), even though the Indonesian Ministry 
of Defence and the Singapore Government 
attempted to clarify that this agreement 
would benefit both countries. This is 
because there are several articles in the 
agreement which are deemed to violate 
Indonesia's territorial sovereignty which 
must be aborted or corrected and are very 
substantial, one of them is the article that 
allows Singapore to invite other countries to 
carry out training in MTA that is inside the 
territory of Indonesia. With the non-
ratification of the DCA, it means that up to 
now there has been no legal protection for 
the defense cooperation between the two 
countries, although the defense cooperation 
between Indonesia and Singapore is 
increasing, especially in the field of 
education and joint training.  
 
Flight Identification Region (FIR) 
Management in Indonesia's Sovereign 
Territory and Extradition Agreement 
The renegotiation process of DCA 
Indonesia and Singapore cannot be 
separated from other problems that hamper 
the closed bilateral relations between the 
two countries, namely the management of 
the Flight Identification Region (FIR) in the 
Riau Islands Airspace and the extradition 
agreement between the two countries. 
Although the two problems are not the 
defense sector, the DCA Indonesia-
Singapore is influenced and affects the 
success of solving other problems.  
The absence of an extradition agreement 
between Indonesia and Singapore is a 
problem that is very detrimental to 
Indonesia because it has been used by many 
suspected perpetrators of the Indonesian 
corruption crime to flee to Singapore, or just 
make it a transit point. Singapore greatly 
benefits from the funds brought by the 
corruptors, because it can increase the 
resources needed by the country in carrying 
out development (Paluluh, 2018). 
Indonesia's efforts to make an extradition 
agreement between two countries began in 
1973, but negotiations could only start in 
2005 before signed in 2007, in line with the 
DCA Indonesia-Singapore negotiation 
process. This indicates that this extradition 
treaty is an inseparable unit from the DCA 
Indonesia-Singapore, and when the DCA is 
not ratified by the Indonesian Parliament, 
the extradition treaty cannot be 
implemented (Mahayasa, 2012).  
Another problem is the management of 
FIR in Riau Islands province airspace 
which has been managed by Singapore 
since 1965, as a legacy from the British 
colonial government. The control of air 
space over the cities of Batam, Tanjung 
Pinang, Matak, and Natuna Islands should 
have been carried out by Indonesia as the 
sovereign, but at that time this was not 
possible, because it was deemed not to have 
the ability based on the provisions of the 
Annex 11 Chicago Convention 1944 
(Husna & Riyanto, 2019). This has resulted 
in frequent incidents of Indonesian pilots 
being warned by the Singapore authorities, 
even though they are flying over Indonesian 
territorial airspace, a matter which greatly 
disturbs Indonesia's sovereignty over its 
territory. Indonesia's efforts to convince the 
International Civil Aviation Organization 
(ICAO) for approving the realignment of 
FIR management have been carried out 
 




since 1973, which has then intense in recent 
years. President Jokowi has committed to 
be able to take over the FIR by 2019 by 
accelerating the preparation of the 
necessary technology and human resources, 
however, this has not yet been realized by 
the end of 2020. Singapore always trying to 
convince that FIR management is not based 
on sovereignty, but on aviation safety 
issues, is incompatible with the 1944 
Chicago Convention and the UNCLOS 
1982, which was strengthened by RI Law 
Number 1 of 2009 on aviation, stated that 
airspace over the land and waters of 
Indonesia as country's air sovereignty 
(Handini & Risdiarto, 2019). FIR 
realignment process is in a series with an 
agreement on the Military Training Area 
(MTA) which is part of the Indonesia-
Singapore DCA, so the two agreements 
must be carried out simultaneously.  
 
The Process of Renegotiating the 
Indonesia-Singapore DCA 
The importance of the relationship between 
the two neighboring countries requires the 
existence of a defense cooperation 
agreement that has national and 
international legal provisions. In 2019 
Singapore, which initially objected, finally 
willing to renegotiate with Indonesia, with 
the DCA Indonesia-Singapore 2007 as a 
reference. Since then a series of meetings 
have been held, and in the Covid-19 
pandemic situation, the activities were 
conducted virtually. Besides, both parties 
realize that the DCA Renegotiation process 
cannot be separated by the agreement of 
two other related agreements, namely the 
extradition agreement (Wicaksana, 2016) 
and the FIR realignment agreement (Purba, 
2020). 
In the renegotiation process, the two 
countries agreed to discuss the FIR 
realignment and the DCA renegotiation 
using the Framework for Negotiation, the 
main points of which contain (1) the two 
countries understand that the FIR problem 
is not about sovereignty but security and 
efficiency of air traffic for advancing 
international civil aviation and recognizing 
that military training in the South China Sea 
is governed by Article 51 UNCLOS 1982, 
(2) Singapore understands Indonesia's 
desire to harmonize the FIR by its territorial 
sovereignty as soon as possible, and (3) 
Indonesia fully respects and recognizes 
Singapore's right to conduct training 
militarily in the South China Sea (SCS), by 
Article 51 (1) UNCLOS 1982. Based on 
this, the DCA and the FIR discussions will 
be carried out simultaneously but in a 
separate session, while the extradition 
agreement becomes a package with the 
DCA agreement in the deal. 
Based on the agreed negotiation 
framework, the DCA renegotiation process 
will be focused on making adjustments to 
the points of rejection of the House of 
Representatives of the Republic of 
Indonesia (DPR RI) in the 2007 DCA that 
related to violations of sovereignty, namely 
article 3 about ‘training cooperation’ and 
article 13 ‘entry into force, duration, and 
termination’ from DCA Indonesia-
Singapore 2007. However, the main focus 
of the renegotiation was mainly aimed at 
access granted to Singapore for training its 
Armed Forces in MTA which are within the 
Indonesia territory. Indonesia cannot refuse 
to provide MTA facilities to Singapore, 
because it was part of the agreement with 
Singapore when ratified the UNCLOS 
1982. 
As it is known, the UNCLOS 1982 is a 
sign of the success of Indonesian diplomacy 
in fighting for Indonesia's national interests 
through international law and treaties, with 
the recognition of the archipelagic state 
regime which has doubled Indonesia's 
territory and obtained sovereignty claims 
over the territorial waters and air between 
its islands (Darmawan, 2019). However, 
Indonesia's success cannot be unilateral, but 
a reciprocal agreement must be made 
between Indonesia and other interested 
countries, including Singapore. In an 
international agreement, an interest that is 
obtained must be balanced with other 
interests that must be released, UNCLOS 
 




1982 has been agreed through a consensus 
mechanism so that reservations are not 
possible to the provisions of the articles in 
it, also known as the package deal (Buzan, 
1981).   
 
Defense Diplomacy in Total War 
Strategy 
In an explanation, it is said that diplomacy 
is a mechanism used to realize national 
interests and also to maintain the national 
security of a country (Fendrick, 2010). 
Diplomacy is also an important element in 
resolving political disputes between 
countries, to prevent bloodshed caused by 
wars using armed force (Gray, 2007). 
Because of its usefulness, the diplomacy of 
a country is then made into one of the 
elements of national power, which can be 
used to influence other parties to act as 
expected (Kunz & Morgenthau, 1948). So 
that diplomacy has been used as one of the 
important instruments for a country to 
achieve its national goals, in addition to 
intelligence, military, and economy 
(Hertenstein, 2019). 
Likewise, defence diplomacy is none 
other than diplomacy which utilizes a 
country's defense/military assets as a tool to 
implement a country's foreign policy and 
national security (Pajtinka, 2016). Defence 
diplomacy is described as a negotiation 
practice that uses methods and instruments 
that do not increase hostility, with the main 
task of forming military cooperation 
between countries (Drab, 2018). The use of 
defence diplomacy is increasingly seen as 
important as a tool to fight for foreign 
policy and national security in the post-cold 
war era (Muniruzzaman, 2020). For 
Indonesia, which always seeks to find 
peaceful solutions in resolving every 
conflict that occurs with other parties, 
defence diplomacy is used as one of the 
main alternatives (Budi & Berantas, 2014). 
Meanwhile, total war itself has become a 
popular strategy used in major wars that 
occurred in the 20th century, starting in 
World War I and continuing until the end of 
the cold war era (Chickering, Forster, & 
Greiner, 2005). Even the definition of total 
war is increasingly being developed for use 
in the 21st century, as a result of 
globalization, technological developments, 
financial trends, and the involvement of 
civilians (Barrett, 2014). Indonesia has also 
made total war strategy a part of the 
country's defense strategy, which uses all its 
national strength, not only military but also 
economic strength and diplomatic 
capabilities (Kemhan, 2014). In which the 
implementation of Total war strategy by 
Indonesia in war has been applied since the 
revolutionary period between 1945-1949, 
with the implementation of war with armed 
force (hard power) combined with 
diplomatic efforts (soft power) 
simultaneously and mutually supportive 
(Nasution, 1965).  
Diplomacy, in this case, defence 
diplomacy, can no longer be separated from 
the total war strategy implemented by 
Indonesia. It is not only used as a tool to 
resolve political disputes so that war does 
not occur but also as a means to implement 
a Total war strategy in realizing national 
interests. Especially if we study further the 
features of the Indonesian Total war 
strategy, namely: 
1. Community (Kerakyatan), which means 
that the war being held in the right and 
obligation of all citizens, according to 
their respective professions, to protect 
the interests of all Indonesian people. 
2. Universality (Kesemestaan), which 
means utilizing all elements of national 
power, both resources, and available 
facilities and infrastructure, for efforts to 
defend the country. 
3. Territoriality (Kewilayahan), which 
explains that defense efforts are 
implemented in a decentralized manner 
throughout Indonesia's sovereign 
territory, but still to achieve the same 
goals. 
From these characteristics, it can be 
interpreted that all the people and elements 
of the national power can be involved in 
efforts to defend the country in the integral 
unit, by not having to use weaponry, but 
 




simply by making a dedication to their 
respective profession, without having to 
make themselves as a combatant (Abdi & 
Wijayanto, 2020). Based on this 
explanation, an employee of the Indonesian 
Government Institutions can participate in 
defending his country in a "war" situation 
using Defence Diplomacy as a tool, as a 
representative of their field of service, 
without having to carry weapons and hold 
the status of a combatant. 
 
Total War Strategy Implemented in the 
Renegotiation of the Indonesia-
Singapore DCA 
The unratified of the DCA Indonesia-
Singapore by the Indonesian Parliament 
does not solely constitute a potential threat 
to the survival of the nation, but the 
development of defense cooperation 
between the two countries is hampered by 
the absence of a formal protective legal 
basis. However, there are two other 
negotiation efforts, related to the settlement 
of the DCA, which could be a potential 
threat to Indonesia's national interests. 
Indonesia has an interest in not giving up 
control of its airspace to other countries and 
Indonesia has an interest in arresting 
corruptors who run and hide in Singapore 
and return to their homeland some of the 
corrupted money. Meanwhile, Indonesia 
still wants to maintain its dignity by 
maintaining its commitment to provide 
access to MTA in its territory, as part of an 
agreement with Singapore when fighting 
for UNCLOS 1982 to be operationalized 
globally. 
There are differences in the national 
interests of each party, causing Indonesia 
and Singapore to wage a fierce "war" at the 
negotiating table so that their wishes can be 
optimally realized. That the war in the 21st 
century has changed the concept of 
conventional warfare, that war no longer 
requires a large battlefield, nor does it 
require a declaration of war, the minimal 
use of weapons during the war does not 
reduce the impact of enormous damage. 
Therefore, the contemporary war that 
occurred must be faced with an appropriate, 
adaptive, and flexible strategy, involving all 
other potential powers in the economic, 
political, and other fields (Risman, 2018). 
The total war which has been chosen as 
a national defense strategy is expected to be 
a solution to the conflict of interest between 
two neighboring countries and bring victory 
to Indonesia in the ongoing negotiation 
process, through several accommodative 
adjustments without losing the sovereign 
rights of a nation. The implementation of 
the total war strategy in the renegotiation 
activities of the Indonesia-Singapore DCA 
can be explained through the characteristics 
inherent in the Indonesia Total war strategy, 
community, universality, and also 
territoriality.   
Community characteristics are carried 
out through activities of the DCA 
Renegotiation, FIR Realignment, and 
extradition negotiations were mostly 
attended by individuals from institutions 
outside the military/defence scope, but what 
was produced was closely related to efforts 
to uphold nations sovereignty. Because of 
this, each individual must realize that what 
is being done is part of an effort to defend 
the state which is an obligation for all 
Indonesian citizens in defending the 
country. Because this negotiation activity is 
part of an effort to defend the country, what 
must be the final goal was not threatening 
the sovereignty of the state or causing a 
territory controlled by other countries for 
any reason, including safety issues. An 
understanding of this must be instilled at the 
time of preparing for the negotiations, the 
occurrence of differences in perceptions 
needs to be avoided, by prioritizing state 
sovereignty as the main goal. The strategy 
applied in the negotiations must be made 
flexible, so as not to conflict with the 
framework for negotiation that has been 
agreed upon. Although state sovereignty is 
the main focus of negotiations, it does not 
leave other matters such as aviation safety, 
or provisions that apply in international law 
and treaties. The awareness in focussing on 
state sovereignty must continue to be 
 




emphasized during pre-negotiation 
activities so when dealing with 
Singaporeans, the Indonesian is no longer 
divided into different perspectives. 
The implementation of the Indonesia 
Total War Strategy must also be 
characterized by universality by involving 
all available resources or elements of 
national power. In the DCA renegotiation, 
especially to limit, reduce, or relocate the 
location of the MTA, another reason is 
needed outside the defence/military sector 
which Singapore considers to have been 
thoroughly discussed at the signing of the 
DCA in 2007. This requires the 
involvement of other institutions outside 
defence/military bodies, to provide strong 
reasons that are supported by applicable 
national or international regulations. 
Involvement of other institutions includes 
the Ministry of Environment which 
expresses views on the need to carry out 
conservation in the MTA area, the Ministry 
of Transportation by conveying increased 
frequency train trips, civil aviation, and 
commercial ship crossing, the Ministry of 
Energy and Mineral Resources and also 
Pertamina, which describes the existence of 
a submarine pipeline network, and the 
Regional Governments of South Sumatra 
and Riau Islands which describe the 
development of conditions of the density of 
the surrounding community in the last 15 
years, including the Ministry of Fisheries 
which explains about the expansion of the 
fishing area of local fishermen. The final 
result that is expected from the involvement 
of all other related elements is the 
emergence of an understanding from the 
Singaporean of the wishes of the Indonesian 
regarding the MTA due to a reasonable 
reason and should have been done.  
The next characteristic is territoriality, 
which can be explained that the 
implementation of operations is carried out 
in a decentralized manner while remaining 
integrated into a single ‘Command’. 
Decentralized in the sense that all 
preparation processes in the framework of 
negotiations are carried out independently 
by each Ministry as the Focal Point, in this 
case, the DCA Renegotiation by the 
Ministry of Defence, Realignment FIR by 
the Ministry of Transportation, and the 
Extradition Agreement by the Ministry of 
Law and Human Rights. When the 
preparations have been carried out, as was 
done during conventional warfare, it is 
necessary to have a unit of command that 
will integrate the implementation of the 
negotiations. The Command Unit or lead 
integrator will have to coordinate 
interactively between focal points so that 
the results of the achievements of the 
negotiations can be synergistic in 
supporting the expected final goals 
(Prakoso, 2016). The appointed lead 
integrator does not have to be from the 
military/defense, because the overall 
strategy applied is not only in the defense 
sector but also involves other fields, such as 
Economy, Transportation, and also Law. In 
the case of the Indonesia-Singapore DCA 
Renegotiation which acts as a command 
center, is the Coordinating Ministry for 
Maritime Affairs and Investment 
(Kemenko Marvel).  
So far, Kemenko Marvel has carried out 
its function as a lead integrator, by holding 
a series of joint meetings between focal 
points to equalize the understanding of the 
Indonesian delegation, before or during 
negotiations with the Singaporean. 
Meanwhile, the Ministry of Defence 
continues to coordinate with other related 
Institutions for DCA Renegotiations. This 
strategy making the DCA and FIR 
negotiations can be in line with the national 
defense strategy which aims to always 






Based on the explanation of the research it 
can be concluded that the Total war used by 
Indonesia as its State Defence Strategy can 
be applied in various forms of war. Not only 
conventional warfare that uses weapons and 
 




bloodshed, but also contemporary wars that 
occurred in the 21st century where the use of 
weapons is minimal but the impact can be 
enormous. In its implementation, Total war 
can use means that are hard power, or with 
soft power, with Defence Diplomacy being 
one of the soft power. How Total war 
strategy can be applied in Defence 
Diplomacy can be analyzed through the 
characteristics inherent in the Indonesia 
Total war strategy, namely, commonality 
marked by the involvement of all people, 
universality marked by the use of all 
elements of national power, and 
territoriality marked by operational 
decentralization by the scope of its 
functions respectively but still integrated 
with achieving the same ultimate goal.  
In the case of the DCA Indonesia-
Singapore Renegotiation, which is a part of 
defence diplomacy, especially in the 
preparation of bilateral defense cooperation 
agreements, a total war strategy needs to be 
implemented so that the results are achieved 
can be in line with national interests. It is 
not only the interest of defense cooperation 
but also the interest in taking over the 
management of the FIR over the Riau 
Islands Province and the interest in 
composing an extradition agreement 
between Indonesia and Singapore. The 
characteristics of the Indonesia Total war 
Strategy have been embodied in the 
ongoing process, due to the growing 
awareness of defending the state from each 
individual involved in the negotiations, as 
part of the involvement of all related 
ministries/institutions, as well as being 
carried out by the scope of the duties of each 
focal point, with the Kemenko Marvel 
acting as the lead integrator to unify the 
entire interrelated negotiation process to 
achieve the same goals in harmony. 
However, the use of total war as a 
strategy to resolve complex conflicts of 
interest has not been consistently 
implemented or its use is not realized, 
which results in frequent problem-solving 
in segmentation, not in one goal. This is due 
to the lack of understanding of the concept 
of implementation of the Indonesia total 
war strategy in contemporary wars. 
Therefore, further research is needed to find 
out how the Total War can be applied in 
various contemporary war situations in the 
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